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| Metropolitan Epiphanius, the head of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, left, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, center, and Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko during a meeting prior to sign “Tomos” decree of autocephaly for Ukrainian church at the Patriarchal Church of St. George in Istanbul, Turkey, Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019. |
Religious
conflict in Ukraine has been much in the news of late, ever since President
Petro Poroshenko very publicly embraced the ambitious idea of creating a
single, unified Orthodox Christian church out of the country’s many Orthodox denominations.
This idea, long dear to the hearts of Ukrainian nationalists, kept the issue on
the front pages of the media in Ukraine, Russia, and other predominantly
Orthodox countries for most of 2018.
Then, quite
unexpectedly, he got his wish. On January 6, 2019, the Patriarch of
Constantinople, primus inter pares among Orthodox Church hierarchs worldwide,
granted Poroshenko a church document (tomos) designating the newly minted
Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) as the sole legitimate and independent Orthodox
church in Ukraine. The question that many Orthodox Christians both in Ukraine
and elsewhere are now asking themselves is, at what cost?
The Tomos Wunderwaffe
What makes
this turn of events so startling is that before October 2018 all the
established autocephalous Orthodox Churches recognized the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (UOC-MP), as the sole canonical Orthodox church in Ukraine. This church
had been granted “independence and autonomy in its administration” by the
extraordinary Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on October 27,
1990, nearly a year before Ukraine declared its own independence. Later, in
1992, the Metropolitan of Kiev, having earlier lost his bid to become Patriarch
of Moscow, proclaimed himself Patriarch of Kiev and set up his own Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (the UOC-KP, or Kievan Patriarchate).
Since then,
the UOC-MP, the UOC-KP, and the much smaller Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church (UAOC) have coexisted in tense, mutual non-recognition. Ukrainian
nationalists have long found it troubling that the majority of the country
attends a church whose nominal head resides in Moscow. On the wave of
nationalism inspired by the 2014 Maidan Revolution and the war with Russia,
therefore, they introduced legislation to change this. Draft law 4128 would
have allowed parishes to transfer to another church’s jurisdiction by a simple
majority vote of those who self-identify with the community and participate in
its religious life. Draft law 4511 was even more intrusive. It required that
all religious charters explicitly endorse the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and laws of Ukraine (art. 3). Candidates for the leadership of
religious organizations would require state approval (art. 5), as would any
invitations to foreign religious leaders (art. 6). Finally, in the event of
systematic violations of law, or collaboration with “military-terrorist
groups,” the state could terminate a religious organization (art. 7). Both laws
were widely criticized by religious groups in Ukraine and were never even
brought up for a vote.
When this
plan was first conceived the achievement of autocephaly seemed highly
improbable, since not a single Orthodox church recognized either the Kievan
Patriarchate or the UAOC. By early 2018, however, Poroshenko’s entourage came
to believe that the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholemew I, might be
willing to reconsider his position on Ukrainian autocephaly. According to press
accounts, Pavlenko took this idea to the president, promoting it is as a sort
of Wunderwaffe or “silver bullet” that could sharply boost the president’s
abysmal ratings.
A Bit of Byzantine Geopolitics
While it is
apparent how president Poroshenko benefits from the creation of a local
Orthodox Church of Ukraine, what does the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholemew I,
stand to gain from endowing it with exclusive legitimacy? Simply put, the
chance to prove that he is still an influential figure in the Orthodox world.
In the centuries since its own autocephaly, the size and influence of the
Patriarchate of Moscow has waxed, while that of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople has waned. The Ecumenical Patriarch thus makes four points.
First, that
in the 1300s the Kievan metropolia moved to Moscow without the Ecumenical
Patriarch’s permission. Second, that the tomos of autocephaly granted to Moscow
never included the metropolia of Kiev. Third, that when Moscow was granted the
right to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev in 1686, it was on the condition that
the latter commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch as his ecclesiastical superior,
“to demonstrate the canonical jurisdiction of Constantinople over this
Metropolis.” Finally, that “since Russia, as the one responsible for the
current painful situation in Ukraine, is unable to solve the problem, the
Ecumenical Patriarchate assumed the initiative of resolving the problem.”
The Moscow
Patriarchate disputes each of these assertions. Patriarch Bartholomew seemed to
suggest as much, when he explained that he took up this issue at the insistence
of “the honorable Ukrainian Government, as well as recurring requests by
‘Patriarch’ Philaret of Kiev”.
This
explanation has puzzled many Orthodox Christians. It is quite odd to say that
the Ukrainian government has asked for autocephaly, since autocephaly cannot be
granted to a country. It can only be granted to a canonical Orthodox Church,
and all Orthodox churches, including the Patriarchate of Constantinople, were
in agreement that the UOC-MP was that church. Finally, the UOC-MP itself had not
asked for autocephaly, and emphatically rejected the intercession of the
Ecumenical Patriarch.
Second,
since there was no alternative canonical church in Ukraine to receive
autocephaly, a new church had to be set up quickly to receive its long-awaited
independence. Reconciling the desires of the Kievan Patriarchate and AUOC,
however, proved more difficult than expected. To facilitate matters the
Ecumenical Patriarch sent two envoys to Ukraine to negotiate the following
complicated dance: first, the lifting of the anathema against the leaders of
the two schismatic churches; second, their acceptance of temporary oversight
from the Ecumenical Patriarchate; third, the grant of autocephaly to the newly
constituted local Orthodox Church. Under the best of circumstances this process
could take decades. Thanks to the keen determination of Kievan Patriarch
Filaret, and the engagement of president Poroshenko, however, it was all
accomplished by the end of the year, just days shy of the official start of the
presidential campaign.
What Does the Future Hold for Ukrainian
Orthodoxy?
Domestic
political and religious aspects aside, one is struck by the ease with which the
new OCU accepted the constraints imposed upon it by the Patriarch of
Constantinople under the terms of the tomos, such as the head of the OCU’s
demotion from patriarch to metropolitan. The OCU has also been forced to give
up all its jurisdictions outside Ukraine, including its rather extensive and
well-funded communities in the United States and Canada,. Any OCU clergyman
dissatisfied with an administrative decision made by his superiors may now
appeal directly to the Ecumenical Patriarch, whose decisions are final.
Moreover, on matters of doctrine, the OCU pledges to adhere to “the
authoritative opinion” of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Some view these
conditions as part of an effort by the Ecumenical Patriarch to assert a claim
to supremacy among his fellow hierarchs, which has only added to their
reluctance to embrace the OCU.
Finally,
the global Orthodox community has not split, as many predicted it would.
Instead, it has rallied around the beleaguered UOC-MP, highlighting the
isolation of the Patriarch of Constantinople.
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