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poniedziałek, 29 kwietnia 2019

Guest post:The Gospel According to Poroshenko: Politics, Religion, and the New Church of Ukraine

This is an abbreviated version of the article originaly published by Yale Journal of International Affairs.
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Metropolitan Epiphanius, the head of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, left, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, center, and Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko during a meeting prior to sign "Tomos" decree of autocephaly for Ukrainian church at the Patriarchal Church of St. George in Istanbul, Turkey, Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019. (Mykola Lazarenko, Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Pool Photo via AP)
Metropolitan Epiphanius, the head of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, left, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, center, and Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko during a meeting prior to sign “Tomos” decree of autocephaly for Ukrainian church at the Patriarchal Church of St. George in Istanbul, Turkey, Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019.

Religious conflict in Ukraine has been much in the news of late, ever since President Petro Poroshenko very publicly embraced the ambitious idea of creating a single, unified Orthodox Christian church out of the country’s many Orthodox denominations. This idea, long dear to the hearts of Ukrainian nationalists, kept the issue on the front pages of the media in Ukraine, Russia, and other predominantly Orthodox countries for most of 2018.

Then, quite unexpectedly, he got his wish. On January 6, 2019, the Patriarch of Constantinople, primus inter pares among Orthodox Church hierarchs worldwide, granted Poroshenko a church document (tomos) designating the newly minted Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) as the sole legitimate and independent Orthodox church in Ukraine. The question that many Orthodox Christians both in Ukraine and elsewhere are now asking themselves is, at what cost?

The Tomos Wunderwaffe
What makes this turn of events so startling is that before October 2018 all the established autocephalous Orthodox Churches recognized the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), as the sole canonical Orthodox church in Ukraine. This church had been granted “independence and autonomy in its administration” by the extraordinary Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on October 27, 1990, nearly a year before Ukraine declared its own independence. Later, in 1992, the Metropolitan of Kiev, having earlier lost his bid to become Patriarch of Moscow, proclaimed himself Patriarch of Kiev and set up his own Ukrainian Orthodox Church (the UOC-KP, or Kievan Patriarchate).


Since then, the UOC-MP, the UOC-KP, and the much smaller Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) have coexisted in tense, mutual non-recognition. Ukrainian nationalists have long found it troubling that the majority of the country attends a church whose nominal head resides in Moscow. On the wave of nationalism inspired by the 2014 Maidan Revolution and the war with Russia, therefore, they introduced legislation to change this. Draft law 4128 would have allowed parishes to transfer to another church’s jurisdiction by a simple majority vote of those who self-identify with the community and participate in its religious life. Draft law 4511 was even more intrusive. It required that all religious charters explicitly endorse the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and laws of Ukraine (art. 3). Candidates for the leadership of religious organizations would require state approval (art. 5), as would any invitations to foreign religious leaders (art. 6). Finally, in the event of systematic violations of law, or collaboration with “military-terrorist groups,” the state could terminate a religious organization (art. 7). Both laws were widely criticized by religious groups in Ukraine and were never even brought up for a vote.

When this plan was first conceived the achievement of autocephaly seemed highly improbable, since not a single Orthodox church recognized either the Kievan Patriarchate or the UAOC. By early 2018, however, Poroshenko’s entourage came to believe that the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholemew I, might be willing to reconsider his position on Ukrainian autocephaly. According to press accounts, Pavlenko took this idea to the president, promoting it is as a sort of Wunderwaffe or “silver bullet” that could sharply boost the president’s abysmal ratings.

A Bit of Byzantine Geopolitics
While it is apparent how president Poroshenko benefits from the creation of a local Orthodox Church of Ukraine, what does the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholemew I, stand to gain from endowing it with exclusive legitimacy? Simply put, the chance to prove that he is still an influential figure in the Orthodox world. In the centuries since its own autocephaly, the size and influence of the Patriarchate of Moscow has waxed, while that of the Patriarchate of Constantinople has waned. The Ecumenical Patriarch thus makes four points.

First, that in the 1300s the Kievan metropolia moved to Moscow without the Ecumenical Patriarch’s permission. Second, that the tomos of autocephaly granted to Moscow never included the metropolia of Kiev. Third, that when Moscow was granted the right to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev in 1686, it was on the condition that the latter commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch as his ecclesiastical superior, “to demonstrate the canonical jurisdiction of Constantinople over this Metropolis.” Finally, that “since Russia, as the one responsible for the current painful situation in Ukraine, is unable to solve the problem, the Ecumenical Patriarchate assumed the initiative of resolving the problem.”

The Moscow Patriarchate disputes each of these assertions. Patriarch Bartholomew seemed to suggest as much, when he explained that he took up this issue at the insistence of “the honorable Ukrainian Government, as well as recurring requests by ‘Patriarch’ Philaret of Kiev”.

This explanation has puzzled many Orthodox Christians. It is quite odd to say that the Ukrainian government has asked for autocephaly, since autocephaly cannot be granted to a country. It can only be granted to a canonical Orthodox Church, and all Orthodox churches, including the Patriarchate of Constantinople, were in agreement that the UOC-MP was that church. Finally, the UOC-MP itself had not asked for autocephaly, and emphatically rejected the intercession of the Ecumenical Patriarch.

Second, since there was no alternative canonical church in Ukraine to receive autocephaly, a new church had to be set up quickly to receive its long-awaited independence. Reconciling the desires of the Kievan Patriarchate and AUOC, however, proved more difficult than expected. To facilitate matters the Ecumenical Patriarch sent two envoys to Ukraine to negotiate the following complicated dance: first, the lifting of the anathema against the leaders of the two schismatic churches; second, their acceptance of temporary oversight from the Ecumenical Patriarchate; third, the grant of autocephaly to the newly constituted local Orthodox Church. Under the best of circumstances this process could take decades. Thanks to the keen determination of Kievan Patriarch Filaret, and the engagement of president Poroshenko, however, it was all accomplished by the end of the year, just days shy of the official start of the presidential campaign.

What Does the Future Hold for Ukrainian Orthodoxy?
Domestic political and religious aspects aside, one is struck by the ease with which the new OCU accepted the constraints imposed upon it by the Patriarch of Constantinople under the terms of the tomos, such as the head of the OCU’s demotion from patriarch to metropolitan. The OCU has also been forced to give up all its jurisdictions outside Ukraine, including its rather extensive and well-funded communities in the United States and Canada,. Any OCU clergyman dissatisfied with an administrative decision made by his superiors may now appeal directly to the Ecumenical Patriarch, whose decisions are final. Moreover, on matters of doctrine, the OCU pledges to adhere to “the authoritative opinion” of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Some view these conditions as part of an effort by the Ecumenical Patriarch to assert a claim to supremacy among his fellow hierarchs, which has only added to their reluctance to embrace the OCU.

Finally, the global Orthodox community has not split, as many predicted it would. Instead, it has rallied around the beleaguered UOC-MP, highlighting the isolation of the Patriarch of Constantinople.


Author: Nicolai N. Petro (www.npetro.net) is Professor of Politics and Silvia-Chandley Professor of Peace Studies and Nonviolence at the University of Rhode Island. He writes frequently about church-state relations in Ukraine and Russia. His latest book, Ukraine in Crisis, was published by Routledge in 2017

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